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NOTES AND Co miENTs

CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY
IN CRIMINAL CASES
It has been stated that the "stool pigeon"' is the most effective of
present day police weapons. The "stool pigeon" is an informer. He
is frequently an accomplice of others, who having had the misfortune
to be apprehended, now seeks to turn states evidence against his
co-partners in crime. Many criminal cases involve the use by the
state of testimony of such accomplices, and the result has usually
been satisfactory from the standpoint of convictions obtained. When
a crime has been committed, there is a natural tendency on the part
of everyone to believe that all are guilty who have a convincing web
of implication wound about them. There can be no doubt that when
one who has been convicted of crime or has confessed to its commission takes the witness stand and testifies that others were his
partners in the nefarious deed, there is a convincing stigma of guilt
cast upon the accused party or parties. At first blush, everyone is
prone to accept as truth the revelations of an accomplice chiefly because of a popular belief that one who confesses or is convicted and
subsequently "tells the whole story" is forever telling the truth m order
to clear his conscience. Indeed, accomplice testimony is coming to
be a more frequent basis of convictions as time goes on. There have
been several strong indications of approval of allowing convictions to
stand on such testimony alone in recent years. 2 However, in Kentuckv
as m many other jurisdictions when one is charged with commission
of a crime by an alleged accomplice the courts are confronted by a
code provision which provides:
"A conviction can not
accomplice, unless corroborated by
the defendant with the commission
tion is not sufficient if it merely

be had upon the testimony of an
other evidence tending to connect
of the offence; and the corroborashows that the offense was com-

mitted, and the circumstances thereof."3

This type of statute is not a codification of the common law In
the English common law institution of the jury trial, there was no
25, 1949, p. 29.
For an observation on the popular opinion concerning the problem, see note
:30, MicH L. REv. 1292 (1932). See also note 35 CorN. L. Q. 663 (1950). The
New York Commission on the Admimstration of Justice urged repeal of New York s
requirement of corroboration. "The Committee was strongly of the opinion that
this section in the present Code is a refuge of orgamzed enme and protects the
pnncipals in racketeering cases.
The Committee carefully considered the pos'COLLIER S, June

sibility that the deletion of this provision rmght encourage frame-ups and related

abuses, but was strongly of the opinion that such would not be the case." New
York Commzssion on the Admmistration of Justice, Third Supplemental Report, p.
16 (Leg. Dec. 1937, No. 77).
3

Ky.

CODE

Ciui. PRoc. see. 241 (Carroll, 1948).

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL

requirement that there be corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice in criminal cases. In early times such testimony when admitted was perfectly capable of sustaining a conviction.- Of course,
other objections such as competence and credibility as a matter of
law remained, but the case is rare when accomplice testimony can be
voided completely under these doctrnes.5 Courts began to recogmze
in the latter stages of the common law certain dangers inherent m
the unquestioned acceptance of testimony of one who was turing
state s evidence against his alleged recent partner in crime. The fact
that the apprehended felon was frequently able to purchase leniency
by implication of others was recognized. 6 It also became obvious that
extrinsic motives such as revenge often prompted known criminals to
manufacture persuasive stories of guilt against others. "Experience
taught the courts to be chary of an accomplices testimony, as there
are so many reasons which may lead one to shift to or share the crime
7
with another."
Frequent distrust of such testimony induced the courts to adopt a
rule of practice whereby the judge would admonish the jury to be
wary of the testimony of an accomplice. 8 This practice, however,
never evolved into a rule of law and the judge was powerless to direct
a verdict of acquittal in a case where there was no corroboration of
the accusations of the accomplice. 9
About one half of the states have now abandoned the common
law rule. 1 The normal replacement of the old practice of admonition
by the common law judges is a statute requiring corroboration of the
testimony of the accomplice. These statutes are a manifestation of
the belief that revenge and hope of leniency by accusing others frequently lead to false testimony The normal safeguards of the statutes
are similar to Kentucky s in that the accomplices testimony is not
sufficient "
uhless corroborated by other evidence tending to con"
An accomplice alone is a competent witness; and that, if the jury,
weighing the probability of the testimony, think him worthy of belief, a conviction

supported by such testimony alone is perfectly legal." R. V Atwood and Robbins,
1 Leach Cr. L. 464 (4th ed.), 168 Eng. Rep. 334 (1788). State v. Hardin, 19
N. C. (P, Dev. & B.) 407 (1837).
'7 WiGMoRE, EvIDENcE, sec. 2056, 312 (3d ed. 1940).

is a practice which deserves all the reverence of law, that judges have
accomplice, unless the accomplice is corroborated in some matenal circumstance.
The danger is, that when a man is fixed, and knows that his own guilt is
detected, he purchases impunity, by falsely accusing others." Regina v. Farler, 8
S"'It

uniformly told junes that they ought not to pay any respect to the testimony of an

C. & P. 106, 108, 173 Eng. Rep. 418, 419 (1937); 1 Hale P C. 305.
'People v. Crum, 272 N. Y. 348, 353, 6 N.E. 2d 51, 58 (1936).
'Regina v. Stubbs, 1 Dears. 555, 169 Eng. Rep. 843 (1855).
'See note, 24 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 623 (1949).
1 7 WIGMoHE, op. cit. supra note 5 at 312.
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nect the defendant with the commission of the offense
-11 Such
statutes place a duty upon the court to determine if there is any corroborating evidence, and if there is not, a directed verdict of acquittal
must be forthcoming.

12

Even though shielded by this statute, persons standing accused by
"accomplices" do not often receive the protection which was the purpose behind the enactment of the corroboration requirements. The
natural tendency to condemn anyone convincingly implicated in an
atrocious crime has been an unrelenting pressure upon the courts to
do violence to the requirements and purpose of the statutes. 13 There
are many cases where court, jury, press and public are convinced of
the truth of the charges merely because the accomplice tells a convmcmg story It is in this type of case, where the testimony is persuasive on its face, that the requirements of other facts tending to
connect the defendant with the commission of the offense is apt to
be circumvented. Skirting of the mandates of the codes is usually
accomplished by a loose decision as to whether or not there is other
evidence before the court amounting to corroboration. Frequently,
courts have found evidence to be sufficiently corroborative which in
reality was not even material or relevant to the charge at all."' 4 Sup"KENrucKy

CODE

Cmrm. Paoc. sec. 241 (Carroll, 1948); supra note 10 at 312.

' The Kentucky Code provides: "In all cases where, by law, two witnesses, or
one witness with corroborating circumstances, are requisite, to warrant a conviction,
if the requisition be not fulfilled, the court shall instruct the jury to render a verdict of acquittal, by which instruction they are bound." Note 3 supra sec. 242.
" See note 2 supra. Many notorious criminals have been convicted on the
basis of accomplice testimony when all other types of proof would have failed.
"Lucky" Luciano, People v. Luciano, 277 N. Y. 348, 14 N.E. 2d 433 (1938). "The
exigencies of public policy remove the result of this particular decision beyond
criticism. Nevertheless, the case is the foundation of a novel and fearfully successful theory for determninig what constitutes sufficient' corroboration of an accomplice s testimony." Note 35 CoRNi. L. Q. 663, 667 (1950). "Murder, Inc." People
v. Nitzberg, 287 N. Y. 183, 38 N.E. 2d 490 (1941), noted 16 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
253 (1942).
" People v. King, 40 Cal. App. 137, 104 P. 2d 521 (1940); accomplice testified that defendant stole a billfold. After the theft defendant demed knowing the
victim. It was proved that tis demal was false, held, this was corroboration of the
accomplices testimony. Kilgore v. State, 67 Ga. App. 391, 20 S.E. 2d 187 (1942);
the defendant was accused of incest with hIs twenty year old daughter. There
was evidence that the defendant had illicit relations with his ister-m-law and that
he had made advances to a neighboring woman, held, this was corroboration of
the testimony of the prosecuting witness. State v. Mundell, 66 Idaho 297, 158 P
2d 818 (1945); defendant was charged with burglary of a garage. In addition to
accomplice testimony implicating hum, it was proved that he had been at the
garage on that day (defendant explained he had gone there to borrow a jack) and
that the accomplices had spent the mght with the defendant, held, corroboration.
Price v. Som., 296 Ky. 144, 176 S.W 2d 271 (1943); defendant was accused of
chicken stealing on the basis of accomplice testimony. It was proved that the defendant had been seen with the two accomplices on the ight of the theft at a
place not near the scene of the crime, held, corroboration. People v. Dixon, 231
N. Y. 111, 131 N.E. 752 (1921); defendant was convicted of murder on the
testimony of another vho testified that defendant had paid hun to do the job. It
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pose the accomplice tells the harrowing tale of a murder and states
in the course of his testimony, "I had my shoes shined that morning
at a shoe shme stand on Broadway" Subsequently the prosecution
introduces the shoe shme boy as a witness who testifies, "Yes, I shined
the shoes of Mr. Accomplice that morning." Granted the truth of
this insignificant fact, it m no manner connects the defendant with the
commission of the offense. "Yet such proof is poisonous because the
jury naturally gleans the impression that it shows the truthfulness of
the entire tale of the accomplice and thus established his complete
credibility"' 5 As a matter of fact, the additional evidence offered
for confirmation in this instance merely shows that the accomplice is
truthful about a fact which is not in any manner connected with the
commission of the crime and the details thereof. 16 Situations such
as this continue to occur, although the rule has long been recognized
that evidence which merely established the credibility of the testifying
accomplice is of no effect in satisfying the requirement of corroboration. The difficulty m application of this principle is caused by a fallacious belief that if the accomplice is telling the truth about one
thing he is telling the truth about all things.iT Any such belief is entirely erroneous because when an "accomplice" falsely accuses another,
the accomplice can always relate some immaterial fact which can be
established by subsequent witnesses. When such irrelevant matter
is confirmed, it can in no manner reasonably be said that it is indicative
of a complete truthful revelation on the part of the accuser.is
Some highly publicized criminal trials have been based on accomplice testimony '9 Effect was recently given to the Kentucky Code
provision regarding such testimony in the case of Daggit v Commonwas proved that on the mght of the murder that defendant was seen to hand the

other $5 on a crowded street, held, corroboration. Hathcoat v. State, 71 Okla. Cr.
5, 107 P 2d 825 (1940); defendant was charged with chicken stealing on the basis
of testimony of two accomplices. It was proved that the defendant was seen m
the company of the two accomplices on the day of the theft at a place not adjacent

to the scene of the theft, held, corroboration. Wormser, Corroborationof Accom-

plices in Crminal Cases, 11 FoiD L. REv. 193 (1942); see also, People v. Becker,
215 N. Y. 126, 109 N.E. 127 (1915), People v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 103 N.E.

305 (1913).
'"

Wormser, Corroborationof Accomplices in Criminal Cases, 11 FoiD. L. REv.

193, 198 (1942).

' See People v. Maione, 284 N. Y. 423, 31 N.E. 2d 759 (1940).

l'People v. Kress, 284 N.Y. 452, 459, 31 N.E. 2d 898, 901 (1940); Com. v.

Bosworth, 39 Mass. 397 (1839).

' People v. Nitzberg, 287 N. Y. 183, 189, 38 N.E. 2d 490, 493 (1941); "But
if an accomplice-witness could be supported at large by independent evidence that
he told the truth in matters of that sort, then every accomplice (not incompetent

for want of understanding) could always rake into his story matenals for such
confirmation of it."
" See note 13 supra.
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wealth.20 In that case the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction arising out of one of the most notorious murder trials m the history of the
state. Edward Kilgore, a convicted double murderer, months after
his conviction implicated his former friend Daggit m the crime. Daggit
was indicted and charged with being an accessory before the fact to
murder. At his trial, Kilgore was the principal witness for the prosecution. He testified to the details of the murder asserting that Daggit
was his accomplice m the heinous deed. In its attempt to corroborate
the testimony of Kilgore, the prosecution brought m several facts. An
attempt was made to establish an inference that the crime m all probability was committed by more than one man. On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals correctly held that even if the evidence
had been such as to show that the crime was committed by a hundred
men, there is nothing m this evidence to even point a finger of suspicion at Daggit."2 1 There was evidence to the effect that a revolver was
stolen from a house where Daggit had resided some four months after
Daggit had moved from that particular home and six months prior to
the commission of the crime. It was also established that Daggit and
Kilgore were close companions and were seen on many occasions together. The court said that none of ths evidence tended to connect
the defendant with the commission of the crime.2 2 In addition it was
established that Daggit had made the statement, "I love that boy If
anything happens to him, I cannot bear it. If he is in prison, I want
to be in prison too." The position of the court was unassailable when
it said, "Although other inferences reasonably could be drawn from
this statement, it is not susceptible of the inference that Daggit was
2 3
connected with the murder."
The Daggit case is, therefore, an outstanding one m that with
penetrating wisdom the court eliminates proof offered as corroborative whch in reality was of no value whatsoever, but merely established some independent facts in no manner connected with the act
involved. The only effect the evidence of the prosecution was capable
of producing was one indicating a likelihood that Kilgore was telling
the truth. This is nothing more than a round about method of establishing the credibility of Kilgore, and as has been pointed out, evidence
24
going to the credibility of the testifying accomplice is not enough.
The requirement of independent proof of the defendant's participation
in the very acts charged was clearly not fulfilled in this case, and the
-1'314 Ky. 721, 237 S.W 2d 49 (1951).
" Id. at 725, S.W at 51.
"Id. at 726, S.V at 51.
Id.
727,35
S.W
at 52.
-4
See atnote,
CoRN.
L. Q. 663 (1950).
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decision that a verdict of acquittal should have been directed by the
trial court is undoubtedly a correct one.25
The court n the Daggit case did more than merely remedy the
situation resulting from the trial court's common error of accepting
evidence as corroborative which m reality only established mdependent irrelevant facts. The court made frequent reference to the
fact that Kilgore s testimony was a bit fantastic:
"The entire testimony of Kilgore indicates that he is a person lacang
in mental stability, even though he may know nght from wrong. On
tls account, the evidence, which it is contended corroborates his
testimony, must be viewed with a great deal of scrutiny." 26

It is believed that this reasoning of the court may come to be the

foundation of a rule which affords more protection to one accused of
crime by an accomplice than is presently followed in most jurisdictions.
The court apparently recognized that although the sanity of Kilgore
was not sufficiently inpaired to be the basis of a blanket exclusion of
testimony under the rule of incompetency, 27 it was sufficiently m doubt
to cause the court to take some other action in the nature of protection
for the accused. The action taken on the basis of the obvious mental
instability of Kilgore was that"
the evidence, which it is contended
corroborates his testimony, must be viewed with a great deal of
scrutiny 28 In effect, there must not only be independent material
corroborating evidence, but the testimony concerning this evidence
will be subjected to a particularly careful examination where the witness is suspected of insanity or instability It is true that the credibility
of an accomplice witness is a matter for the decision of the jury 28
However, after the decision in the Daggit case the defendant is apparently not left to the mercy of the jury even though the testimony
of the accomplice is admissible and even though there are other facts
proved which appear to be corroborative. This is because of the
nature of the testimony itself, that is to say, if it is such as to raise
suspicion, the corroborative evidence will be viewed with greater care
than in the ordinary case where the testimony of the accomplice is
not questionable per se.
The Daggit case may possibly be criticized by pointing out that
once the testimony of the accomplice has been admitted as evidence,
the court should take no action on the corroboration requirement based
on its own belief of the credibility of principal testimony, credibility
" See Williams v. Com., 257 Ky. 175, 77 S.W 2d 609 (1934).
" Note 20, supra at 725, S.W at 51.
'73 JONES, EVIDENCE, 1299 sec. 723 (4th ed. 1938).
Note 26, supra.
3 JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 27 at 1687 sec. 901a.
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being traditionally the province of the jury It is believed, however,
that the Kentucky court is merely admitting a truth which in reality is
necessarily practiced by all courts, probably without their realization
of it. Deciding the question whether evidence is truly corroborative
or not is often an intricate task. Any court is bound to be influenced
by its own observation that the testimony of the accomplice himself
which is sought to be corroborated is stigmatized with suspicion, and
m a case where courts are skeptical, they are likely to be more demanding in their requirements of corroboration.
The Daggit case goes far in its protection of one who is accused
of crime by a person who claims to be his accomplice. It is believed,
however, that the reasons which led the courts and legislatures to adopt
the requirements of corroboration are still valid. The case may very
well become a leading one for corroboration at a time when the requirement is being neglected in many jurisdictions.
JAmms DANEL Comux~rE

IRRIGATION IN KENTUCKY AS AFFECTED BY THE LAW OF
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
The beneficial use of irrigationi is not confined to the and and semiand western states. It has been very effective m the humid areas of
the eastern and southeastern states. Irrigation was very effective in
Kentucky this year, although it was used on a small acreage.
With the price of Kentucky farm land surpassing previous peaks,
farm commodities nearing record prices and farm labor being rapidly
absorbed by Kentucky s expanding industries and Federal sponsored
projects, the Kentucky farmer is being induced and forced into purchasing more farm machinery and fertilizers, and using modern, economical farming methods. After obtaining a high level of soil fertility
with such practices, he is confronted with the ageless problems of insufficient moisture for maximum and efficient crop production. In Kentucky, there were thirteen years in a twenty-year period studied in
"The Latin word 'irrgare from which the term 'irrigation is derived means,
pnmarily to convey water to or upon anything and, more generally, to wet or
moisten. In our language, the ordinary and popular conception of the term is that
it denotes the application of water to land for the production of crops. The mere
method of obtaining the water with which to irrigate has nothing to do with the
process of irrigation or with the meaning of the word; the term embraces all artificial watering of lands, whether by channels, by flooding, or merely by sprinlding."
30 Am. Jur. 598 (1940).

